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OIL AND GAS LAW—RENT OR ROYALTIES:
NORTH DAKOTA JOINS THE MAJORITY OF STATES
IN ADOPTING THE “AT THE WELL” RULE
FOR CALCULATING ROYALTIES ON OIL AND GAS LEASES
Bice v. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C., 2009 ND 124, 768 N.W.2d 496

ABSTRACT
In Bice v. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C., the North Dakota Supreme Court
expressly announced it joined the majority of states following the “at the
well” rule for calculating royalties on oil and gas leases. The “at the well”
rule defines the wellhead as the appropriate point for royalty calculation;
royalty may be calculated using the comparable sales method or the workback method. Of the two methods, the comparable sales method is the
preferred method for calculating market value. However, when comparable
sales evidence is not available, it is appropriate to use the workback
method. Following the workback method, lessees begin with the point of
sale price received, then deduct reasonable post-production costs to arrive at
the market value of oil or gas at the wellhead. Thus, Petro-Hunt properly
deducted post-production costs before calculating royalty. In addition, the
North Dakota Supreme Court held “free use” lease clauses allowed PetroHunt to use residue gas off the leased premises to fuel the central tank
batteries because the residue gas was used in furtherance of lease operations. Finally, the court determined Petro-Hunt’s deductions for risk-capital
and depreciation were not excessive. The Bice decision brings stability to
an unsettled area of North Dakota law, and the rule is likely to impact future
oil and gas lease dealings in the state.
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FACTS

In 1976, Gulf Oil Corporation discovered the Little Knife Field in
Dunn, Billings, and McKenzie Counties of North Dakota.1 During the late
1970s, Gulf Oil Corporation built the Little Knife Gas Plant to treat the gas
obtained from the Little Knife wells.2 A disagreement developed between
Gulf Oil Corporation and the Little Knife royalty owners in the early 1980s
concerning how gas should be valued for royalty purposes.3 The parties
reached a settlement agreement in 1983.4 The agreement stated Gulf Oil
Corporation and the royalty owners agreed gas royalties “would be determined by adding all of the sources of revenue from the sale of gas and gas
products and subtracting from that total certain costs associated with

1.
2.
3.
4.

Bice v. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C., 2009 ND 124, ¶¶ 2, 5, 768 N.W.2d 496, 498-99.
Id. ¶ 2, 768 N.W.2d at 498.
Id.
Id.
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processing the gas.”5 In 1997, Petro-Hunt acquired the Little Knife Gas
Plant and interests in the field.6
The Little Knife Field produced sour gas, which was not a marketable
product.7 Petro-Hunt pumped sour gas from the field and routed the gas to
one of three central tank batteries.8 The batteries separated oil and water
from the gas before sending individual streams of gas, oil, and water to the
Little Knife Gas Plant; the plant processed the sour gas into marketable
sweet gas.9 The sweet gas was then sold at or downstream of the plant
tailgate.10 Pursuant to its interpretation of the “free use” clauses in its
leases, Petro-Hunt used residue gas processed at the Little Knife Gas Plant
as fuel for operating the central tank batteries.11
Regardless of the royalty clause in each lease, Petro-Hunt calculated
royalty payments on the same basis for every royalty owner.12 Although
the language was not identical, the parties agreed the royalty clauses were
substantially similar and required royalty calculation “based on the market
value of the gas at the well.”13 In 2001, the royalty owners filed suit against
Petro-Hunt, claiming underpaid royalties were due because Petro-Hunt
deducted post-production costs before calculating royalties.14 In 2007, the
district court granted partial summary judgment for Petro-Hunt on the issue
of royalty calculation and determined that the royalties should be calculated
under the workback method.15 The workback method allowed deduction of
post-production expenses before royalties were calculated.16 When discovery was complete, the district court granted Petro-Hunt’s summary

5. Id.
6. Id. ¶ 3, 768 N.W.2d at 499. By merging with Gulf Oil Corporation in 1985, Chevron
obtained the Little Knife Gas Plant and interests in the Little Knife Field. Id. In 1992, Chevron
sold the plant and its interests in the field to the William Herbert Hunt Trust Estate. Id. Five years
later, in 1997, the estate conveyed its interests in the plant and field to Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. Id.
7. Id. ¶¶ 8, 20, 768 N.W.2d at 500, 502.
8. Id. ¶ 22, 768 N.W.2d at 503.
9. Id. Other products, including sulfur and butane, were also extracted. Id.
10. Id. ¶¶ 2, 22, 768 N.W.2d at 498, 503. “Tailgate” is defined as: “[t]he delivery point for
residue gas after processing and removal of liquid constituents in a processing plant.” HOWARD
R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 1037 (13th ed. 2006).
11. Bice, ¶ 22, 768 N.W.2d at 503. Each lease in question contained a “free use” clause. Id.
12. Id. ¶ 4, 768 N.W.2d at 499.
13. Id.
14. Id. ¶ 5. The royalty owners were granted class certification in 2004. Id. The class
included “[a]ll persons who own, or have owned, any minerals and/or royalty interests or
overriding royalty interests located within the Little Knife Field of Dunn, Billings and McKenzie
Counties of North Dakota from which gas was processed at the Little Knife Gas Plant.” Id.
15. Id. ¶ 6. The Honorable Zane Anderson of the Billings County District Court Southwest
Judicial District partially granted Petro-Hunt’s motion for summary judgment on April 30, 2007.
Brief of Appellees at 1, 10, Bice, 2009 ND 124, 768 N.W.2d 496 (No. 20080265).
16. Bice, ¶ 6, 768 N.W.2d at 499.
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judgment motion on the remaining issues, which related to the use of residue gas at the central tank batteries and deductions for depreciation and
risk-capital.17 The royalty owners appealed, claiming the grant of summary
judgment for Petro-Hunt was erroneous as a matter of law.18
On appeal, the royalty owners raised three issues.19 First, the royalty
owners asserted the district court erred in deciding post-production costs
could be deducted before calculating royalties.20 The royalty owners
argued the North Dakota Supreme Court should reject the “at the well” rule,
which allowed Petro-Hunt to deduct post-production costs before royalty
calculation.21 Instead, the royalty owners asked the North Dakota Supreme
Court to adopt the first marketable product doctrine, under which PetroHunt could not deduct post-production costs before calculating royalties.22
Second, the royalty owners claimed the district court erred in finding the
“free use” clauses allowed Petro-Hunt to use residue gas off the leased
premises without paying royalty on that residue gas.23 The royalty owners
maintained the “free use” clauses only permitted Petro-Hunt to use residue
gas on, and not off, the leased premises without cost.24 Third, the royalty
owners contended the district court erred when it concluded Petro-Hunt’s
deductions for risk-capital and depreciation were not excessive.25 Affirming the district court’s summary judgment decision, the North Dakota
Supreme Court adopted the “at the well” rule for calculating royalties on oil
and gas leases, held the “free use” clauses authorized Petro-Hunt to use
residue gas off the leased premises, and determined Petro-Hunt’s deductions for risk-capital and depreciation were proper.26

17. Id. The district court’s order granting Petro-Hunt’s summary judgment motion was
issued on July 30, 2008. Brief of Appellees, supra note 15, at 10.
18. Bice, ¶ 7, 768 N.W.2d at 499. Professor Owen L. Anderson argued on behalf of the
royalty owners before the North Dakota Supreme Court. Id. (syllabus). Professor Anderson,
Eugene Kuntz Chair in Oil, Gas, and Natural Resources at the University of Oklahoma College of
Law, received his Juris Doctor from, and is a former professor of, the University of North Dakota
School of Law. The University of Oklahoma College of Law Faculty Pages, http://www.law.ou.
edu/faculty/anderson.shtml (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).
19. Bice, ¶¶ 10, 22, 28, 768 N.W.2d at 500, 502, 504.
20. Id. ¶ 10, 768 N.W.2d at 500.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. ¶ 22, 768 N.W.2d at 502.
24. Id. ¶ 23, 768 N.W.2d at 503.
25. Id. ¶ 28, 768 N.W.2d at 504.
26. Id. ¶¶ 1, 21, 27, 29, 31, 33, 768 N.W.2d at 498, 502, 504-06.

2009]

CASE COMMENT

923

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Bice implicated several important concepts relating to oil and gas law.
First, the implied duty to market is summarized to demonstrate the genesis
of the majority and minority rules pertaining to the deductibility of postproduction expenses when calculating royalty. Next, the development of
the “at the well” rule is examined, and the two methods for calculating
market value at the well under the majority rule are addressed. Finally, the
first marketable product doctrine is considered, including the different
approaches that have emerged among the states following the minority rule.
A. THE IMPLIED DUTY TO MARKET
This discussion begins by defining several terms that frequently appear
in oil and gas leases. The party entitled to drill and operate wells under a
lease is the lessee.27 The lessor, on the other hand, is the royalty owner.28
“Production” generally refers to a process of obtaining crude oil or natural
gas from a well.29 The actual point where gas is removed from the ground
is known as the “wellhead.”30
The implied duty to market has long been a part of oil and gas law.31
Today, the major oil and gas producing states acknowledge the lessee has a
duty to market its product, as implied in every oil and gas lease.32 However, this implied duty to market necessarily gives rise to costs, and the
question of which costs a lessee is required to bear has been debated.33
Often, the central issue in royalty disputes relates to “expenses incurred by
the lessee after production passes through the wellhead . . . .”34
As a result, two theories, one known as the “at the well” rule and the
other as the first marketable product doctrine, have developed.35 The “at
the well” rule and first marketable product doctrine address which party is
responsible for expenses incurred after gas reaches the wellhead.36 While
each approach recognizes that the lessee must bear the costs of exploration
27. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 10, at 554. Thus, Petro-Hunt was the lessee in Bice.
See Bice, ¶ 3, 768 N.W.2d at 499.
28. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 10, at 554.
29. Id. at 814-15.
30. Id. at 1143 (citing Schroeder v. Terra Energy, Ltd., 565 N.W.2d 887, 890 (Mich. 1997)).
31. Byron C. Keeling & Karolyn King Gillespie, The First Marketable Product Doctrine:
Just What is the “Product”?, 37 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 20 (2005).
32. Edward B. Poitevent, II, Post-Production Deductions from Royalty, 44 S. TEX. L. REV.
709, 713 (2003).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 713, 716-17.
36. Id. at 713.
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and production, the theories diverge concerning the point at which
production ends.37
B. THE “AT THE WELL” RULE
The majority of states follow the “at the well” rule, under which the
“implied duty to market production does not require a lessee to bear the
costs of marketing production alone.”38 In other words, the majority rule
provides that costs arising after the gas reaches the wellhead may be shared
between the lessee and lessor.39 The three major oil and gas producing
states, Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi, follow the “at the well” rule.40
Under the case law of these three states, the “at the well” rule generally
provides that the appropriate point for royalty calculation is the wellhead,
where the oil or gas is captured from the ground and converted into
property.41 Accordingly, the majority rule provides that post-production
expenses, such as dehydration and transportation costs, may be deducted
before royalty is calculated.42
Wall v. United Gas Public Service Co.,43 a 1943 Louisiana Supreme
Court decision, is an early case in the development of the “at the well”
rule.44 In Wall, the lease provided that royalty would be calculated on the
“market price.”45 Because the lessee paid transportation and processing
costs to sell the gas at a point two miles away from the gas field, the lessee
calculated royalty based on the value of the gas at the well, rather than on
the amount for which the gas was actually sold.46 The royalty owner
argued, however, that the royalty should have been calculated based on the

37. Id.
38. Id. at 716.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 720. One article lists Montana, California, Kentucky, and New Mexico as states
that adhere to the “at the well” rule. Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 31, at 51 n.193. Though
written in 2005, the article also includes North Dakota among the majority rule states, based on
the state case of Koch Oil Co. v. Hanson, 536 N.W.2d 702 (N.D. 1995), and the federal decision
of Hurinenko v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 69 F.3d 283 (8th Cir. 1995). Id. Michigan is described as
following the “at the well” rule for leases dated before March 29, 2000. Id. The article also
suggests Alabama is likely to adopt the majority rule, although no appellate court there had yet
addressed the particular issue in a royalty context. Id.
41. Poitevent, supra note 32, at 720.
42. Id. Dehydration involves removing water from the liquid produced at an oil well.
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 10, at 247. Transportation costs include “[t]he costs of
transporting oil or gas to a market.” Id. at 1092.
43. 152 So. 561 (La. 1934).
44. Wall, 152 So. at 562.
45. Id. at 562.
46. Id. at 563.
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price for which the gas was sold.47 The Wall court held in favor of the
lessee and determined that, where the term “market price” is used for royalty calculation, the wellhead is the appropriate point for determining
royalty payments.48 Moreover, the court stated, “[T]he lessee cannot be
taxed with the whole cost of marketing the gas and extracting therefrom the
gasoline.”49
In addition, the Wall court noted the trial judge, in determining whether
the royalty paid was appropriate, had used a workback method by
“deduct[ing] from the price received by [the lessee] the expense of piping
the gas to the place where it was sold . . . .”50 While there was no market
for the gas at the well, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered well prices
from other Louisiana fields to determine whether the royalty paid by the
lessee was adequate.51 The court stated that if such comparable sales information had not been available, the trial judge would have been correct in
using a workback approach.52 That is, the Wall court used a comparable
sales method to determine the propriety of the royalty paid.53 The comparable sales method and the workback method remain the two systems for
lessees to calculate market value at the well in majority rule states.54 In
short, the Wall court allowed the lessee to deduct its transportation and
processing costs before calculating royalty and established a preference for
the comparable sales method—when comparable sales information is
available—over the workback method.55
The Wall rule was developed further in the 1960 Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision of Freeland v. Sun Oil Co.56 The main issue in Freeland
was whether lessors are expected to “bear any part of the cost of processing
[gas.]”57 The Fifth Circuit, interpreting Louisiana law, determined reasonable processing costs, which are necessary for creating or adding value to
gas, may be deducted before royalty calculation.58 The Freeland court
further stated that when comparable sales information is not available, the
workback method may be used to arrive at a market value of gas at the

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 564.
Id.
Id. at 564-65.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 564-65.
Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 31, at 31.
Wall, 152 So. at 564-65.
277 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1960).
Freeland, 277 F.2d at 155.
Id. at 159.
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well.59 The Fifth Circuit opined, “[I]n the analytical process of reconstructing a market value where none otherwise exists with sufficient definiteness,
all increase in the ultimate sales value attributable to the expenses incurred
in transporting and processing the commodity must be deducted.”60
Another significant case in the development of the “at the well” rule is
Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co.61 The Mississippi oil and
gas leases at issue in Piney Woods used the phrase “market value at the
well” for measuring royalties.62 The royalty owners contested Shell’s
practice of deducting processing costs before calculating royalty.63 Noting
Shell’s actions were proper, the Fifth Circuit defined “market value at the
well” as “market value before processing and transportation . . . .”64 Thus,
following the Fifth Circuit’s definition of the term “market value at the
well,” production ends when gas reaches the wellhead, enabling lessees to
deduct subsequent costs of processing, transporting, and marketing.65 With
this holding, the Fifth Circuit implied its rejection of the contrary first marketable product doctrine.66
In summary, the “at the well” rule defines the wellhead as the appropriate point for royalty calculation.67 Under the “at the well” rule, royalty
may be calculated using the comparable sales method or the workback
method.68 Of the two methods, the comparable sales method is the preferred method for calculating market value.69 Using the comparable sales
method, the market value of gas at the wellhead is determined by
“averaging the prices that the lessee and other producers are receiving, at
the same time and in the same field, for oil or gas of comparable quality,
quantity, and availability . . . .”70 Nonetheless, when comparable sales
evidence is not available, it is appropriate to use the workback method.71
Following the workback method, lessees begin with the point of sale price
received, then deduct reasonable post-production costs to arrive at the

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
rule).
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984).
Piney Woods, 726 F.2d at 229.
Id. at 225.
Id. at 231.
Id. at 240.
Id.; Poitevent, supra note 32, at 734 (noting the court’s implicit rejection of the minority
Poitevent, supra note 32, at 720.
Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 31, at 31-32.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 31-32.
Id. at 33.
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market value of oil or gas at the wellhead.72 Thus, oil companies realize a
greater profit in “at the well” jurisdictions because, by deducting post-production costs before royalty is calculated, royalty payments are reduced.73
C. THE FIRST MARKETABLE PRODUCT DOCTRINE
The majority of states74 today follow the “at the well” rule, which
allows lessees to calculate royalty based on the value of production at the
wellhead as opposed to a downstream location.75 On the other hand, a
minority of states have adopted the view “that a lessee’s implied duty to
market production requires a lessee to bear the full cost of any steps
necessary to transform the gas into a marketable condition . . . .”76 In other
words, the minority rule generally permits a lessee to deduct certain costs
from the value of gas only after the lessee has rendered the gas marketable.77 This minority approach is known as the first marketable product
doctrine.78 Interestingly, the first marketable product states of Kansas,
Oklahoma, Colorado, West Virginia, and Arkansas follow different versions of the rule.79
Early deviations from the majority rule were apparent in 1964 with the
Kansas Supreme Court decisions in Gilmore v. Superior Oil Co.80 and
Schupbach v. Continental Oil Co.81 Both cases involved leases which
required royalty payments based on “the proceeds [from] the sale [of gas] at
the mouth of the well.”82 In each case, the lessee deducted compression
costs before calculating the royalty owed.83 In Gilmore, the court relied on

72. Id. at 32.
73. See Poitevent, supra note 32, at 716.
74. Although the “at the well” rule is often called the majority rule, Professor Anderson
believes the first marketable product doctrine is the true majority rule. See Owen L. Anderson,
Rogers, Wellman, and the New Implied Marketplace Covenant, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND.,
Special Inst. On Private Oil and Gas Royalties, Paper 13A-1, 13A-24 n.126 (2003). Professor
Anderson points out the first marketable product jurisdictions include Arkansas, Colorado,
Kansas, Nevada, Oklahoma, West Virginia, Wyoming, and the federal government. Id. Thus, it is
arguably reasonable to conclude the first marketable product doctrine is the majority rule. See id.
75. Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 31, at 51.
76. Poitevent, supra note 32, at 717.
77. Id.
78. Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 31, at 51.
79. Id. at 79 (discussing the different minority rule approaches in Kansas, Oklahoma,
Colorado, and West Virginia); Poitevent, supra note 32, at 744 (outlining Arkansas case law on
the first marketable product doctrine).
80. 388 P.2d 602 (Kan. 1964).
81. 394 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1964).
82. Schupbach, 394 P.2d at 2; Gilmore, 388 P.2d at 604.
83. Schupbach, 394 P.2d at 4; Gilmore, 388 P.2d at 604-05. The lessee installed one large
compressor station on the leased premises to compress all the gas produced from the wells.
Gilmore, 388 P.2d at 604. A compressor station is “[a]n installation in which the pressure of gas
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“the most recent authorities on the subject of the duty to prepare for
market . . .” and concluded the lessee’s implied duty to market required the
lessee to bear compression costs because those costs were “necessary to
make the gas marketable.”84 Accordingly, in both Gilmore and Schupbach,
the Kansas Supreme Court stated that a lessee may not deduct compression
costs before royalty calculation.85
In addition to compression costs, minority rule states have considered
the deductibility of dehydration and gathering costs.86 For instance, in a
1992 Oklahoma case, TXO Production Corp. v. State ex rel. Commissioners
of the Land Office,87 the lessee deducted compression, dehydration, and
gathering costs before calculating royalty.88 The Oklahoma Supreme Court
noted the lessee’s implied duty to market obligated the lessee to bear necessary expenses for obtaining a marketable product.89 Further, because the
court determined compression, dehydration, and gathering costs were
necessary to arrive at a marketable product, the court held the lessee’s
deductions for those expenses were inappropriate.90 Oklahoma’s rule was
subsequently refined in Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc.91 The
Mittelstaedt court reiterated its position from TXO Production Corp., that a
lessee must shoulder the costs necessary to create a marketable product.92
Yet, the court concluded that if a marketable product was already obtained,
the lessee could properly deduct, before calculating royalty, reasonable
post-production costs incurred to enhance the product.93
is raised for transmission through pipe lines while the gas is cooled, scrubbed and dehydrated.”
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 10, at 180.
84. Gilmore, 388 P.2d at 607. The Gilmore court observed, “The only purpose for the
compressing station was to put enough force behind the gas to enable it to enter the pipeline on the
lease. This made the gas marketable and was in satisfaction of the duties of the lessee to do so.”
Id. at 606.
85. Schupbach, 394 P.2d at 5; Gilmore, 388 P.2d at 607.
86. See, e.g., Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 954 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Okla. 1998); TXO
Prod. Corp. v. State ex rel. Comm’rs of the Land Office, 903 P.2d 259, 260 (Okla. 1994). See
supra note 42 (defining dehydration). Gathering entails “collecting gas at the point of production
(the wellhead) and moving it to a collection point for further movement through a pipeline’s
principal transmission system.” WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 10, at 434 (quoting N. Natural
Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 929 F.2d 1261, 1265 (8th Cir. 1991)).
87. 903 P.2d 259 (Okla. 1994).
88. TXO Prod. Corp., 903 P.2d at 260.
89. Id. at 262.
90. Id.
91. 954 P.2d 1203 (Okla. 1998).
92. Mittelstaedt, 954 P.2d at 1205.
93. Id. The Mittelstaedt court stated:
[T]he lessor [royalty owner] must bear a proportionate share of such costs if the lessee
can show (1) that the costs enhanced the value of an already marketable product, (2)
that such costs are reasonable, and (3) that actual royalty revenues increased in
proportion with the costs assessed against the nonworking interest.

2009]

CASE COMMENT

929

Colorado’s rule on the deductibility of post-production costs is similar
to Oklahoma’s approach, as evidenced by the Colorado Supreme Court’s
decision in Garman v. Conoco, Inc.94 In Garman, the court considered
whether an overriding royalty interest owner could be required to share in
post-production costs.95 Relying on the implied duty to market, which the
court determined was implied in every oil and gas lease,96 the Colorado
Supreme Court held that the lessee alone was obligated to bear the postproduction expenses necessary to obtain a marketable product.97 However,
the court pointed out that a lessee could deduct costs incurred to enhance
the value of an already marketable product.98
Various permutations of the first marketable product doctrine have
emerged in the states following the minority rule.99 Generally, in Kansas,
Oklahoma, and Arkansas, a lessee is responsible for all expenses, except
transportation costs, to produce a marketable product.100 Lessees in
Colorado and West Virginia, however, usually shoulder transportation
costs, in addition to other expenses incurred in creating a marketable
product.101 One author notes a chief criticism of the minority rule “is that it
can be difficult to determine when the gas becomes ‘marketable,’ and the
states that have adopted the marketable product rule have provided little
guidance.”102 Because there is no defined marketability standard in the first
Id.
94. 886 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1994).
95. Garman, 886 P.2d at 653. An overriding royalty is “[a]n interest in oil and gas produced
at the surface, free of the expense of production, and in addition to the usual landowner’s royalty
reserved to the lessor in an oil and gas lease.” WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 10, at 727.
96. Garman, 886 P.2d at 659 n.21.
97. Id. at 659.
98. Id. at 661. Professor Anderson contends the Garman court adopted the correct rule. See
generally Owen L. Anderson, Royalty Valuation: Should Overriding Royalty Interests and
Nonparticipating Royalty Interests, Whether Payable in Value or in Kind, Be Subject to the Same
Valuation Standard as Lease Royalty?, 35 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 20 (2000). In support of
this viewpoint, Professor Anderson has opined, “Forcing a royalty owner to accept an
unmarketable product would convert the royalty owner’s interest into a cost-bearing interest in
that the royalty owner would have to do something tangible to the product to make it marketable
and, in so doing, duplicate the similar facilities of the operator.” Id.
99. Compare Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 31, at 79-80 (summarizing the rules in Kansas,
Oklahoma, Colorado, and West Virginia), with Poitevent, supra note 32, at 735-50 (discussing
relevant case law in Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Colorado).
100. Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 31, at 79-80; Poitevent, supra note 32, at 744.
101. Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 31, at 80. Professor Anderson notes an arguable
difference exists between the Colorado and West Virginia positions. See generally Anderson,
supra note 74, at 13A-22 to -23. While Colorado does not allow deductions until after the product
is first marketable, West Virginia does not allow a lessee to take any deductions before the first
arm’s-length transaction, even if the product is already marketable at the point of the first arm’slength transaction. See generally id.
102. Brian S. Wheeler, Deducting Post-Production Costs when Calculating Royalty: What
Does the Lease Provide?, 8 APPALACHIAN J. L. 1, 10 (2008).
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marketable product doctrine, lessees in minority rule jurisdictions are unable to predict with certainty which post-production cost deductions courts
will allow.103 Moreover, critics of the first marketable product doctrine
have stated the approach “improperly uses the [implied duty to market] to
reach a result different from that which the parties contemplated in the
express terms of their lease agreement.”104 Lessors, however, have a very
practical reason for favoring the first marketable product doctrine: when
lessees are unable to deduct post-production expenses before calculating
royalty, lessors enjoy higher royalty payments.105
III. ANALYSIS
Justice Crothers authored the opinion in Bice, in which Chief Justice
VandeWalle, Justice Maring, Justice Kapsner, and Justice Sandstrom
joined.106 The court adopted the “at the well” rule in North Dakota for
royalty calculation on oil and gas leases and thus determined Petro-Hunt
acted properly in deducting post-production costs from proceeds before calculating royalty.107 Additionally, the court held the “free use” clauses
allowed Petro-Hunt to use residue gas off the leased premises to fuel the
central tank batteries because the residue gas was used in furtherance of
lease operations.108 Finally, the court determined Petro-Hunt’s deductions
for risk-capital and depreciation were not excessive.109 Therefore, the court
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Petro-Hunt.110
A. NORTH DAKOTA FOLLOWS THE “AT THE WELL” RULE
The first issue presented in Bice was whether the district court erred in
concluding royalties could be calculated after the deduction of postproduction costs.111 The North Dakota Supreme Court was asked to determine whether North Dakota followed the “at the well” rule or the first
marketable product doctrine for calculating royalties on oil and gas
leases.112 Before deciding the issue, the North Dakota Supreme Court
examined both the majority “at the well” rule and the minority first

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Poitevent, supra note 32, at 759.
Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 31, at 116-17.
See Anderson, supra note 98, at 20.
Bice v. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C., 2009 ND 124, ¶¶ 1, 36, 768 N.W.2d 496, 498, 506.
Id. ¶ 21, 768 N.W.2d at 502.
Id. ¶ 27, 768 N.W.2d at 504.
Id. ¶¶ 29, 31, 33-34, 768 N.W.2d at 504-06.
Id. ¶ 27, 768 N.W.2d at 504.
Id. ¶ 10, 768 N.W.2d at 500.
Id.
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marketable product doctrine.113 After a thorough discussion of each rule,
the court analyzed pertinent case law in North Dakota and the Eighth
Circuit.114 Finally, the court ruled on the issue of whether Petro-Hunt could
deduct post-production costs before calculating royalty.115
1.

Majority and Minority Rules

The Bice court first considered the unresolved nature of the law
regarding interpretation of the phrase “market value at the well.”116 The
majority of states follow the “at the well” rule, under which “‘any costs
incurred by the lessee after the [gas] reaches the wellhead . . . may be’
deducted before the royalty is calculated.”117 States following the majority
rule permitted lessees to use one of two methods for calculating the market
value of gas or oil at the well.118 The first method, known as the comparable sales method, enabled the lessee to average prices received by the
lessee and other producers for oil or gas of similar quality, quantity, and
availability to determine the market value of gas at the wellhead.119 The
second method, commonly called the work-back method, allowed a lessee
to determine the market value of gas at the well by deducting reasonable
post-production costs from the price received at a point of sale.120 While
most courts preferred the comparable sales method, the method could not
be used if evidence of comparable sales did not exist.121 The court then
considered which states followed the “at the well” rule: Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Texas, the three major oil and gas producing states, in
addition to California, Kentucky, Montana, and New Mexico.122
In contrast, Arkansas, Colorado, Oklahoma, Kansas, and West Virginia
adopted the minority rule, known as the first marketable product rule.123
Under the minority rule, the lessee paid costs incurred in producing a marketable product, after which point additional costs to enhance the marketability of the gas were shared between the lessee and lessor.124 The primary

113. Id. ¶¶ 13-17, 768 N.W.2d at 500-02.
114. Id. ¶¶ 17-20, 768 N.W.2d at 502.
115. Id. ¶ 21.
116. Id. ¶ 13, 768 N.W.2d at 500.
117. Id. ¶ 13, 768 N.W.2d at 501 (quoting Poitevent, supra note 32, at 716 and Wheeler,
supra note 102, at 7).
118. Id. ¶ 14.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. ¶ 15.
123. Id. ¶ 16.
124. Id.
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problem with the first marketable product rule was the difficulty in ascertaining when the gas became a marketable product.125 Noting this problem,
the Bice court observed that even the minority rule states had not set forth a
clear standard for establishing when a marketable product was produced.126
After analyzing both the majority and minority rules, the court turned its
attention to controlling and persuasive case law.127
2.

Relevant Case Law

Before Bice, North Dakota had not explicitly defined how to calculate
royalty based on “market value at the well.”128 Nonetheless, two North
Dakota cases were considered.129 Amerada Hess Corp. v. Conrad130 and
Koch Oil Co. v. Hanson131 addressed the issue of how to value oil and gas
for purposes of tax assessment. Both decisions announced that the fair
market value of oil and gas could be calculated by deducting processing
costs from gross sales revenues under the workback method.132
The North Dakota Supreme Court next turned its attention to
Hurinenko v. Chevron, USA, Inc.,133 an Eighth Circuit decision interpreting
North Dakota law.134 Hurinenko involved a dispute between royalty
owners and a lessee, where the royalty owners claimed the lessee could not
deduct processing costs before calculating royalties.135 The Eighth Circuit
determined that North Dakota law allowed market value at the well to be
calculated by subtracting processing costs from gross sales revenues.136
Moreover, the Eighth Circuit deemed the workback method especially
appropriate in Hurinenko because “[t]he gas had no readily discernible
market value at the well before the incursion of processing costs to separate
the compounds.”137 While the Bice court noted that federal district court
decisions were not binding upon North Dakota courts, such decisions would
be respected if they were persuasive and based on sound reasoning.138

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. ¶ 17, 768 N.W.2d at 502.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 18-19.
Id. ¶ 18.
Id.
410 N.W.2d 124 (N.D. 1987).
536 N.W.2d 702 (N.D. 1995).
Bice, ¶ 18, 768 N.W.2d at 502.
69 F.3d 283 (8th Cir. 1995).
Hurinenko, 69 F.3d at 285.
Id. at 284-85.
Id. at 285.
Id.
Bice v. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C., 2009 ND 124, ¶ 19, 768 N.W.2d 496, 502.

2009]

CASE COMMENT

933

The facts of Hurinenko were similar to the facts of Bice, and the court
determined the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of market value at the well
was persuasive.139 The Little Knife Field, like the field in Hurinenko,
yielded sour gas with no discernible market value at the well.140 Yet, the
Bice leases stated royalty was to be calculated based on the market value of
gas at the well.141 Petro-Hunt could not use the comparable sales method to
determine the market value of gas at the well because no comparable sales
data existed under the facts in the case.142 Therefore, Petro-Hunt’s only
option for arriving at a market value for gas at the well was the workback
method.143 The North Dakota Supreme Court then expressly announced it
joined the majority of states following the “at the well” rule. Thus, the
district court properly found Petro-Hunt could deduct post-production costs
before calculating royalty.144
B. “FREE USE” CLAUSES ALLOW RESIDUE GAS USE
OFF THE LEASED PREMISES
The second issue in Bice was whether the district court erred in determining Petro-Hunt could use residue gas off the leased premises without
paying royalty on that gas, so long as the gas was used to carry out lease
operations.145 In reaching its decision, the court began by considering the
language of the “free use” clauses.146 Then, the court noted each party’s
interpretation of the clauses.147
First, the leases in question all contained a “free use” clause stating
“either the lessees ‘shall have the right to use, free of cost, gas, oil and
water produced on said land for its operation thereon’ or the lessees ‘shall
have free use of oil, gas and water from said land . . . for all its operations
hereunder.’”148 Petro-Hunt used residue gas processed at the Little Knife

139. Id. ¶ 20, 768 N.W.2d at 502.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. The court stated:
Since the contracted for royalty is based on the market value of the gas at the well and
the gas has no market value at the well, the only way to determine the market value of
the gas at the well is to work back from where a market value exists, meaning using
the work-back method, by deducting post-production costs from the plant tailgate
proceeds.
Id.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. ¶ 21.
Id. ¶ 22.
Id. ¶¶ 26-27, 768 N.W.2d at 503-04.
Id. ¶ 23, 768 N.W.2d at 503.
Id. ¶ 22.
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Gas Plant to fuel its central tank batteries.149 At the central tank batteries,
oil, gas, and water were treated and divided into separate streams.150 Because the residue gas was used to render marketable gas, Petro-Hunt argued
it was entitled to use the residue gas off of the leased premises without paying royalty on the residue gas under the “free use” clauses.151 The royalty
owners countered that because the residue gas was being used off of the
leased premises, Petro-Hunt owed royalties on the gas used to fuel the
central tank batteries.152 That is, the royalty owners interpreted the “free
use” clauses to mean Petro-Hunt could only use residue gas free of cost if
the residue gas was used on, and not off, the leased premises.153
The Bice court noted the issue of “[w]hether residue gas can be used
off of the leased premises, but in furtherance of the lease operations without
paying royalty on that gas under a ‘free use’ clause is an issue of first
impression.”154 The record indicated that functions normally performed at
each well site were performed instead at Petro-Hunt’s central tank batteries.155 Petro-Hunt consolidated its facilities into three central tank
batteries rather than maintaining a battery at each individual well.156 Both
parties benefitted from the efficiency of the central tank batteries, which
resulted in less overall use of gas, a minimum of surface disturbance, and
the recovery of hydrocarbons on which the lessors received royalties.157
The North Dakota Supreme Court next commented that the royalty
owners’ interpretation of the “free use” clauses could lead to an absurd
result.158 For instance, if use of residue gas was allowed only on, and not
off, the leased premises, those royalty owners with a gas producer’s central
tank battery on their property would bear the entire burden of the “free use”
clauses, despite other royalty owners also benefiting from the central tank
battery.159 Because the record demonstrated the residue gas was used to
further the lease operations, the court held the district court properly determined Petro-Hunt could use residue gas off the leased premises without
paying royalty on that gas.160

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 23.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 26.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 27, 768 N.W.2d at 504.
Id.
Id.
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C. DEDUCTIONS FOR RISK-CAPITAL AND DEPRECIATION
WERE NOT EXCESSIVE
The third and final issue in Bice was whether the district court erred in
finding Petro-Hunt’s deductions for risk-capital and depreciation were not
excessive.161 To begin its analysis, the court considered the royalty owners’
claim that, because the Little Knife Gas Plant made a profit every year, no
risk existed and therefore a risk-capital charge by Petro-Hunt was not justified.162 Next, the court examined the royalty owners’ contention that PetroHunt’s depreciation deduction was excessive.163
1.

Risk-Capital

To approach the final issue in Bice, the North Dakota Supreme Court
first analyzed whether the district court properly found Petro-Hunt’s riskcapital charges were commercially reasonable.164 In support of its claim
that Petro-Hunt’s risk-capital deduction was excessive, the royalty owners
argued that no risk existed because the Little Knife Gas Plant realized a
profit every year.165 Petro-Hunt countered that the 1983 settlement agreement explicitly stated risk-capital deductions could be taken.166
The Bice court then focused on the 1983 settlement agreement to
examine the propriety of Petro-Hunt’s risk-capital deductions.167 The 1983
settlement agreement stated, “the cost of risk-capital shall be six percent on
the undepreciated investment in the Little Knife Gas Plant.”168 After
determining Petro-Hunt’s risk-capital charges were calculated according to
the 1983 settlement agreement, the court commented, “the [royalty owners]
fail[ed] to explain why the parties to the 1983 settlement agreement are no
longer bound by that agreement.”169 In addition, the royalty owners had not
demonstrated why a six percent risk-capital charge was excessive.170 As
the party resisting summary judgment, the royalty owners were required to
present competent, admissible evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of

161. Id. ¶ 28.
162. Id.
163. Id. ¶ 30, 768 N.W.2d at 505.
164. Id. ¶ 28, 768 N.W.2d at 504.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. ¶ 29.
168. Id.
169. Id. The royalty owners who signed the 1983 agreement had claimed they were no
longer bound by that agreement because, according to the royalty owners, Petro-Hunt breached
the terms of the 1983 settlement agreement. Brief of Appellants at 13, Bice, 2009 ND 124, 768
N.W.2d 496 (No. 20080265).
170. Bice, ¶ 29, 768 N.W.2d at 504.
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material fact.171 Because the royalty owners failed to produce such evidence, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined Petro-Hunt’s riskcapital charges were commercially reasonable and allowable as a deduction
from sales proceeds before calculating royalty.172 Thus, the district court’s
grant of Petro-Hunt’s summary judgment motion regarding the risk-capital
charge was proper.173
2.

Depreciation

Next, the court considered the claim that Petro-Hunt’s depreciation
deductions were excessive.174 The royalty owners offered three reasons in
support of their stance.175 First, the royalty owners argued the 1983 settlement agreement disallowed a depreciation charge after July 22, 1990.176
Second, the royalty owners claimed Petro-Hunt depreciated the Little Knife
Gas Plant below its salvage value.177 Third, the royalty owners alleged the
fair market value of the plant exceeded the undepreciated amount.178
a.

The 1983 Settlement Agreement

The royalty owners contended the 1983 settlement agreement prohibited Petro-Hunt from charging depreciation after July 22, 1990.179
Petro-Hunt asserted its practice of charging depreciation after 1990 was
proper because the 1983 settlement agreement did not require all depreciation to occur before July 22, 1990.180 In response to these arguments, the
North Dakota Supreme Court looked to the language of the 1983 settlement
agreement.181 Because the 1983 settlement agreement incorporated by

171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 504-05.
174. Id. ¶ 30, 768 N.W.2d at 505.
175. Id. ¶¶ 30, 32-34, 768 N.W.2d at 505-06.
176. Id. ¶ 30, 768 N.W.2d at 505.
177. Id. ¶ 32.
178. Id. ¶ 34, 768 N.W.2d at 506.
179. Id. ¶ 30, 768 N.W.2d at 505.
180. Id.
181. Id. A relevant excerpt of the 1983 settlement agreement follows:
Depreciation on a 13 year straight line method shall be allowed . . . . If at the end of
thirteen (13) years from plant start-up (July 22, 1990), or when only 10% of the
processed gas is being delivered from Little Knife Field, whichever is earlier,
casinghead gas produced from the Little Knife Field is still being processed at the
Little Knife Plant, the fair market value of the plant facilities shall be compared to the
book value . . . contained in the agreement with the Tax Commissioner and if the fair
market value at said time is greater, royalty shall be paid to the then owners on the
difference.
Id. ¶ 31.
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reference an agreement with the Tax Commissioner, the court reviewed the
Tax Commissioner agreement as well.182
After analyzing both the 1983 settlement agreement and the Tax Commissioner agreement, the court determined the plain language of neither
agreement barred Petro-Hunt from charging depreciation after July 22,
1990.183 Petro-Hunt annually reviewed the Little Knife Gas Plant’s economic status, in accordance with the Tax Commissioner agreement.184 In
sum, the court concluded Petro-Hunt followed the practices described in the
agreements in question and therefore depreciation charges were not prohibited after July 22, 1990.185
b.

Salvage Value

The royalty owners next argued that Petro-Hunt’s depreciation charges
were excessive because the Little Knife Gas Plant was depreciated below its
salvage value.186 Petro-Hunt, on the other hand, contended $656,818
remained to be depreciated before the plant was depreciated below salvage
value.187
The purchase price of the Little Knife Gas Plant was
188
Although the royalty owners claimed the plant could not be
$6,213,452.
depreciated below its salvage value of $3,341,357, the royalty owners had
failed to consider the “purchase price was net of salvage value because the
salvage value had already been deducted from [Petro-Hunt’s] purchase
price.”189 Furthermore, the royalty owners overlooked Petro-Hunt’s depreciable capital investments in the plant, totaling $2,128,352.190 Therefore,
the court determined Petro-Hunt could properly depreciate $8,341,804, the
sum of the $6,213,452 purchase price and $2,128,352 capital investments.191 Petro-Hunt had only depreciated $7,684,986, and $656,818 thus
182. Id. The Tax Commissioner agreement referred to in the 1983 settlement agreement
stated:
Actual depreciation charges will be based on a schedule using the straight line method
over an assumed plant life of 13 years. This 13-year plant life will be subject to
review each fiscal year to determine if anything significant has occurred that would
warrant a change in the estimated economic life of the plant. If such a change is found
to be warranted, the remaining depreciation will be adjusted appropriately.
Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. ¶ 32.
187. Id.
188. Id. ¶ 33, 768 N.W.2d at 505-06.
189. Id. ¶ 33, 768 N.W.2d at 506.
190. Id. Petro-Hunt made new capital investments to the Little Knife Gas Plant of
$2,282,415, of which $2,128,352 could be depreciated. Id.
191. Id.
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remained for depreciation.192 Because the royalty owners did not dispute
these figures, the royalty owners had not demonstrated a genuine issue of
material fact existed regarding whether the plant was depreciated below
salvage value.193 As a result, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the
district court’s finding that Petro-Hunt did not depreciate the Little Knife
Gas Plant below its salvage value.194
c.

Fair Market Value

Finally, the royalty owners asserted Petro-Hunt should not have been
allowed to depreciate the Little Knife Gas Plant because the fair market
value of the plant was in excess of the undepreciated amount.195 This claim
was based on a provision within the 1983 settlement agreement.196 Consequently, the royalty owners argued, Petro-Hunt had improperly calculated
royalty.197 Petro-Hunt countered that the royalty owners had not offered
evidence to prove the plant’s fair market value was above its undepreciated
value.198 The district court granted Petro-Hunt’s motion for summary judgment on the matter, finding the royalty owners neglected to provide “any
competent admissible evidence” in support of their claim.199 In reviewing
the district court proceedings, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated competent, admissible evidence must be presented by a party opposing summary judgment, and the evidence must show a genuine issue of material
fact is in dispute.200 The royalty owners, in failing to offer evidence that the
fair market value of the plant was greater than the undepreciated amount,
had not met their burden to resist summary judgment.201 Thus, the North
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for Petro-Hunt.202
IV. IMPACT
With the “at the well” rule in place, parties to North Dakota oil and gas
lease agreements can feel confident their intentions at lease formation will
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. ¶ 34.
196. Id. See supra note 181 (providing the relevant excerpt of the 1983 settlement
agreement).
197. Brief of Appellants, supra note 169, at 7.
198. Bice, ¶ 34, 768 N.W.2d at 506.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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be enforced.203 In addition, the adoption of the majority rule brings stability
to an unsettled area of law in North Dakota.204 By rejecting the minority
rule, many problems and inconsistencies associated with the rule will be
avoided.205 Further, the “at the well” rule will likely prevent litigation,
thereby conserving resources for both parties and courts.206 Finally, while
Bice ultimately benefits oil companies, royalty owners are still protected
from lessee abuses under North Dakota law.
A. LEASE FORMATION INTENTIONS ENFORCED
As a general rule in North Dakota, a contract must be construed according to the parties’ mutual intentions at the time of contract formation.207
Some critics of the first marketable product doctrine note inconsistencies
within the minority rule can render it “a poorly disguised device to rewrite
oil and gas leases in a way that permits royalty owners to participate in
downstream activities for which they have shared none of the risks and
assumed none of the costs.”208 Moreover, another critic of the first marketable product doctrine states, “Under the [first marketable product doctrine],
a lessor’s royalty is not based upon the value of the gas when the lease is
signed . . . but the value of the gas after it has been enhanced exclusively by
the lessee.”209 By adopting the “at the well” rule, the North Dakota
Supreme Court acted in accordance with the state’s settled law of contract
interpretation, requiring a contract to be interpreted according to the parties’
intentions at the formation of the contract.210 As a result, parties to North
Dakota oil and gas leases can feel confident their original intentions will be
honored should a lease dispute arise and proceed to litigation.211

203. Contra Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 31, at 116-17.
204. Bice, ¶¶ 18, 21, 768 N.W.2d at 502.
205. Cf. Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 31, at 81 (listing flaws in the first marketable
product doctrine); Poitevent, supra note 32, at 759 (discussing major criticisms of the minority
rule); Wheeler, supra note 102, at 24 (covering problems with the first marketable product
doctrine).
206. Contra Wheeler, supra note 102, at 1, 25 (noting minority rule states lack a clear
standard on the issue of which costs may be deducted before royalty calculation, frequently
resulting in litigation).
207. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-03 (2008).
208. Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 31, at 104.
209. Wheeler, supra note 102, at 26.
210. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-03 (2008).
211. Contra Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 31, at 104 (asserting the first marketable
product doctrine could improperly be used to rewrite oil and gas leases).
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B. LITIGATION AVOIDANCE
In Bice, the court discussed the unsettled nature of the law as to
interpretation of the phrase “market value at the well.”212 When considering the first marketable product doctrine, the North Dakota Supreme Court
observed a problem with the minority approach as a lack of consistency
relating to the point at which a marketable product is created.213 The
ultimate effect of the first marketable product doctrine is “uncertainty, both
to lessees in calculating their royalty payments and to the courts in resolving royalty disputes.”214 Without a uniform approach to royalty valuation,
the issue must be determined on an individual basis, resulting in case law
that offers little direction to parties confronting a royalty dispute.215
Because of the conflicting doctrines used throughout the states to calculate
royalty, one author believes “[t]he end result will serve only to make
domestic exploration and production even less competitive in the world
marketplace.”216
In contrast, by adopting the “at the well” rule, the North Dakota
Supreme Court announced a clear standard for royalty calculation.217 Parties can now be certain North Dakota courts will not consider “market value
at the well” an ambiguous term.218 Further, the Bice court stated the
appropriate method for determining the market value of gas at the well was
the workback method, whereby the lessee may deduct post-production costs
from proceeds.219 Because a large amount of litigation in the field of oil
and gas law has focused on the issue of which costs may be deducted before
royalty calculation, it is reasonable to assume the court’s acceptance of the
“at the well” rule will work to prevent some litigation in North Dakota. 220
By avoiding litigation, courts and parties conserve resources.221 Domestic
exploration and production could increase as lessees will be able to remove
their focus from litigation and concentrate on competing in the oil and gas

212. Bice v. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C., 2009 ND 124, ¶ 13, 768 N.W.2d 496, 500.
213. Id. ¶ 17, 768 N.W.2d at 502.
214. Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 31, at 82.
215. Anderson, supra note 98, at 20-21.
216. Id. at 21.
217. Bice, ¶ 21, 768 N.W.2d at 502.
218. Id.
219. Id. ¶ 20.
220. Contra Wheeler, supra note 102, at 1 (stating a great amount of litigation has arisen on
the issue of which costs may be deducted before royalty calculation).
221. Contra id. at 25 (noting lessees in first marketable product jurisdictions do not have a
clear standard for deducting costs and, as a result, may face “an endless wave of expensive,
burdensome and wasteful litigation”).
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industry.222 Should a dispute proceed to trial, however, the “at the well”
rule provides greater certainty in predicting an outcome.223 By implementing the “at the well” rule and approving the workback method, the court
resolved a conflicted area of the law, thus providing guidance to lessees,
lessors, and North Dakota courts faced with royalty calculation disputes.224
C. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
From a practical standpoint, lessees benefit under the “at the well” rule
because they do not bear post-production expenses alone, but rather share
these costs with the lessor.225 By deducting post-production costs before
calculating royalty, royalty payments are decreased, and lessees realize
greater profits.226 In the competitive oil and gas industry, it is understandable why lessees would want to take every deduction available to boost
their bottom lines.227 Yet, one critic believes the workback method provides “the lessee . . . an incentive to overstate post-production costs in order
to minimize its royalty-payment obligations.”228 However, North Dakota
law currently requires lessees to provide lessors with “an information
statement that will allow the royalty owner to clearly identify the amount of
oil or gas sold and the amount and purpose of each deduction made from
the gross amount due.”229 Thus, should lessees try to deduct unreasonable
costs, lessors will have notice and can take action.230
V. CONCLUSION
In Bice, the North Dakota Supreme Court adopted the “at the well” rule
for calculating royalties on oil and gas leases.231 Under the “at the well”
rule, lessees are allowed to deduct post-production expenses before royalty
is calculated.232 In addition, the court determined lessees may use residue

222. See Anderson, supra note 98, at 20-21.
223. See Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 31, at 82 (stating the “net effect of the [first
marketable product] doctrine is uncertainty, both to lessees in calculating their royalty payments
and to the courts in resolving royalty disputes”).
224. Bice, ¶ 21, 768 N.W.2d at 502.
225. Poitevent, supra note 32, at 716.
226. See Owen L. Anderson, Calculating Royalty: “Costs” Subsequent to Production—
“Figures Don’t Lie, But . . . .”, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 591, 601-02 (1994).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 597.
229. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-06.3 (2008).
230. See id. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-39.1 to -39.3 (2008) (describing obligations
arising with royalty payments); N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-06-01, -03 to -04 (2008) (addressing
royalty record requirements).
231. Bice v. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C., 2009 ND 124, ¶ 21, 768 N.W.2d 496, 502.
232. Id. ¶ 13, 768 N.W.2d at 501.
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gas off the leased premises in furtherance of lease operations without
paying royalty on that gas under “free use” clauses.233 Finally, the North
Dakota Supreme Court concluded the lessee’s deductions for risk-capital
and depreciation were not excessive.234 The Bice decision brings stability
to an unsettled area of North Dakota law, and the rule is likely to impact
future oil and gas lease dealings in the state.235
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